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Let's stick together 
 
(and break with the past)  
 











The treatment of a number of issues that are being routinely discussed in WTO 
dispute settlement practice could benefit substantially, were economists to be 
institutionally implicated in the process. As things stand, the participation of 
economists in dispute settlement proceedings is infrequent and erratic: for all 
practical purposes, it depends on the discretion of WTO adjudicating bodies. There 
is indirect evidence that recourse to such expertise has been made, albeit on very few 
occasions. Institutional reforms are necessary; otherwise, it seems unlikely that the 
existing picture will change in the near future. A look into ongoing negotiations on 
the DSU review however, leaves no scope for optimism in this respect: involving 
economists in WTO litigation is not a priority-issue. 
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1 A caveat 
 
In this short paper, I do not address the wider issue how economics can help re-draft 
the existing dispute settlement procedures. The issue addressed here is much 
narrower: how economics expertise is and has been used so far in WTO litigation. At 
the end of the paper, I advance some thoughts aiming to explain the scattered use in 
light of the existing need for such expertise. 
 
2 Is economics relevant in WTO litigation? 
 
The short answer is yes. Actually, there are instances where, absent economics 
analysis, it is simply impossible to complete through interpretation the largely 
incomplete WTO contract: how does one calculate dumping or subsidy margin, 
otherwise? Or how does one calculate damage, a necessary step to ensure 
equivalence between inflicted damage and authorized countermeasures, as 
requested by Art. 22.4 DSU? These are but examples, and the list of instances where 
recourse to economics is passage obligé is wider. Such instances are what I will term 
the inner circle of instances where recourse to economics is warranted. 
 
There is however, a wider circle of instances where, although past judiciary practice 
evidences reasonable outcomes (sometimes, at least), the use of economics can 
greatly benefit the quality of legal analysis. Examples here are abundant.1 To cite a 
few: economics can help construct the anti-subsidy counterfactual and thus enable 
an operational definition of subsidy in Art. 1 SCM; it can help discuss the causality-
element (which is a legal requirement for a lawful imposition of duties under all 
contingent protection instruments) in a meaningful manner; it can provide a 
                                                     
1 To paraphrase one of TN Srinivasan's favourite quotes, economics can be of help in thinking about 
anything.  
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coherent framework to discuss like products/services, the key concept in the key 
obligation in the WTO edifice, not to discriminate.2  
 
At the same time, one should be under no illusions as to how much can be achieved 
through recourse to economics. For a start, economics cannot undo economically 
irrational legal instruments, like the WTO agreement on antidumping, for instance: 
judges are agents in a contractual relationship where the principals (the WTO 
Membership) have the sole responsibility to amend the existing contract; on the 
other hand, economics will usually not decide cases. It will however, provide useful 
input and contribute towards an informed decision.  
 
With this discussion in mind we turn to a brief discussion on the institutional 
dimension of recourse to economics expertise in the WTO system.  
 
3 Intellectually desirable, institutionally possible 
 
A look into the various provisions of the DSU suggests a rather limited role for the 
WTO Secretariat in dispute settlement (see Arts. 8 and 12 DSU). In practice, 
however, the WTO Secretariat plays a much more active role than meets the eye that 
is confined to a reading of the DSU: essentially, almost all panel reports are being 
drafted by the WTO Secretariat, panellists reacting to a draft received. This practice 
is explained, and probably justified too, on many reasons. The dominant explanation 
however is the lack of incentives (part-timers, little pay, with a high opportunity cost 
most of the time) for panellists to do what a normal judge does.  
    
                                                     
2 This is in great part what the work undertaken by the American Law Institute on WTO has 
demonstrated, see for a particular reference Horn and Mavroidis (2005).  
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Now, who is the Secretariat? The servicing of panels has been de facto hi-jacked by 
the legal services. Economists have little input, if at all. Yet, the Secretariat includes 
trade economists as well. They have been used however, sparingly so. Keck (2004) 
and the WTO World Trade Report (2005) provide evidence of such use: they do not 
put into question at all the observation that economists will be used on ad hoc basis, 
depending, for all practical purposes, on the will of the enlarged panel (i.e., panellists 
plus Secretariat members). 
 
There is no official record stating the involvement of the Secretariat either. It seems 
however, that the economic divisions have been used primarily in Art. 22.6 DSU 
arbitrations, that is, in the segment of the process where a quantification of 
countermeasures is being requested.3 
 
What has been described above is unofficial use of economics expertise. Officially, 
panels can invite whoever they want, whoever they believe could help them 
understand better a particular case (and, eventually, help them draft a better report): 
Art. 13 DSU provides panels with wide powers to this effect. It reads: 
 
“Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any 
individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such 
information or advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a 
Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member.  A Member should respond 
promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such information as the panel 
considers necessary and appropriate.  Confidential information which is provided 
shall not be revealed without formal authorization from the individual, body, or 
authorities of the Member providing the information.  
                                                     
3 Moreover, when used they have held a rather inconsistent approach in this context: in the US – FSC 
case, the report holds for the proposition that it is impossible to come up with one number when the 
calculation of the counterfactual (i.e., the world minus the observed illegality) is at stake. Measuring 
elasticities, the report concludes that the best estimation is a range of numbers. Yet, in the notorious 
Byrd litigation, the Arbitrators do come up with a number. It seems (although as stated, there is no 
official evidence that this has been the case) that both Arbitrations benefited from economics expertise 
provided by the Economics Division of the WTO. Of course, it could very well be the case that the 
representative of the Economics Division was not heard on both occasions.  
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Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain 
their opinion on certain aspects of the matter.  With respect to a factual issue concerning 
a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may 
request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group.  Rules for the 
establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.” 
(emphasis added). 
 
A look into practice evidences the willingness of panels to use experts only in SPS 
(sanitary-phytosanitary) cases, especially when confronted with contradictory 
expertise.4 A couple of words seem appropriate to shed some light on this issue: SPS 
measures have to be supported by scientific evidence (if not based on precaution). A 
WTO Member challenging a measure (arguing it is WTO-inconsistent), will have to 
provide the basis for its challenge (scientific expertise). Almost unavoidably, it will 
ask scientists to represent the scientific opinion on the field. By the same token, a 
WTO Member whose measures have been challenged as WTO-inconsistent, will 
have to provide the basis for its measures (scientific expertise).  
 
There is not one reported case where panels have invited experts (other than 
physicists, chemists and biologists) to provide scientific expertise. And yet, there 
have been so many opportunities: almost every antidumping-litigation involves a 
discussion on dumping margins, causality etc. To cite a very recent and quite 
notorious example: in the recent US – Upland Cotton dispute, the panel was 
presented with elaborate econometric evidence submitted by one of the parties to the 
dispute. It handled it by itself.5  
 
                                                     
4 That is, the panels on EC – Hormones, Australia – Salmon, Japan – Agricultural Products II and Japan – 
Apples have all had recourse to expertise.  
5 I am not putting into question the final outcome. In fact, I agree with much of the outcome and 
disagree with certain aspects (treatment of decoupled income payments; disciplines on export 
credits). But this is besides the point. Getting it right once is no guarantee that an adjudicating body 
will get it right most of the times.  
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Hence, even when having to react to expertise, panels prefer to duck the issue. It 
seems that in the eyes of most panels, the dismal science is not science enough and 
lay people can develop similar thought patterns (to dismal scientists) even in 
absence of formal education.  
 
It would indeed be quite encouraging for many people, myself included, if the 
labour-intensive part of acquiring such education could be set aside completely. 
Unfortunately, as writings by economists show, the WTO adjudicating bodies by not 
consulting economists have ended up with some very messy outcomes quite often.6 
 
4 Why not defer to expertise? 
 
Why are panels unwilling to have recourse to expertise? The response is not easy. In 
what follows, I simply aim to highlight some of the factors that might have 
influenced a passive attitude by panels so far. For a start, except for one case, there 
are, in principle, no formal institutional constraints as to the legal relevance of 
expertise (under Art. 13 DSU). The one exceptional case is that of prohibited subsidies: 
panels can ask a group, the so called PGE (permanent group of experts), established 
to this effect, to decide whether a scheme is (or is not) a prohibited subsidy. Assuming 
a request to a PGE has been tabled, the requesting panel must accept without any 
modification the decision of the PGE (Art. 4.5 SCM). A panel can of course, always 
blame another entity assuming a type I or type II error has been committed. Practice 
suggests however, that there has been not one single case since 1995 where recourse 
to the PGE has been made (in more than ten cases so far). Panels (probably at the 
advice of the Secretariat) might feel that they will be losing too much power by 
delegating such an important aspect of their work to another entity. 
                                                     
6 See the contributions by Kyle Bagwell, Gene Grossman, Henrik Horn and Bob Staiger in the ALI 
reporters’ studies cited in the References list.  
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Art. 13 DSU does not replicate Art. 4.5 SCM in this respect. Panels are free to decide 
on the legal relevance of the expertise sought. Still, as mentioned above, except for 
the SPS cases mentioned above, they have never had recourse to expertise. The 
absence of a PGE-type of legal compulsion notwithstanding, one would rationally 
expect that panels in practice would defer to expertise, assuming they decided to use 
such evidence. Indeed, how else (in the absence of qualified panellists) could panels 
disregard scientific expertise submitted to them? Assuming they do so light-
heartedly, they risk violating their obligation to justify their findings (Art. 11 DSU). 
Hence, de facto, as opposed to de jure, their ‘hands are tied’ every time they request 
expertise. Do they have the incentive to do that then? On the one side, they can 
always (partly) blame someone else for a wrong outcome. Partly however, it will be 
their fault for having chosen the wrong experts. On the other side, they will be 
giving away much of their authority. Except for Nordstrom (2005), no one, to my 
knowledge, has seriously studies the role and the incentives of the Secretariat. 
Nordstrom’s study supports the observation made above that he Secretariat has an 
important role in drafting panel reports, and points to its unwillingness to share this 
responsibility. Panellists who might wish to be repeat players (panellists) should be 
on the Secretariat’s good books since it is the latter that will propose them to the 
parties any time a panel is being established (Art. 8.6 DSU). 
 
Also, parties to a dispute do not often tilt the balance towards making it necessary 
for the panel to have recourse to expertise: the Upland Cotton dispute is an 
exception to the rule that wants parties not to include in their submissions 
economics expertise. Presented with pure legal constructs as to what causality 
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amounts to in say an antidumping dispute, a panel might feel less obliged to request 
multivariate analysis.7     
 
On the other hand, there are some more legitimate reasons8 why there is, in general, 
a tendency not to request expertise: panels might feel incapable to check the value of 
the expertise provided to them. At the same time, panels might legitimately expect 
that (some) experts might have a (strong) incentive to abuse their position (being the 
informed party in an asymmetry of information-context, where panels are the other 
party). True there are some mechanisms that might help reduce the size of the 
problem (by publishing, as Posner suggests, all expertise provided, assuming no 
confidentiality-related disciplines are not thus violated and inflicting reputation 
costs on experts who are prepared to testify anything against a certain 
compensation), but it is very hard to pretend that this issue does not exist. And there 
is a Division at the WTO, the ERAD (Economics and Research Analysis Division) 
staffed, in its vast majority, with Ph.D economists, which could provide the ‘check’ 
panels might be looking for. Recourse to its expertise however, as both Keck (2004) 
and the World Trade Report (2005) make it amply clear is scarce and unpredictable.   
 
5 Can Lamy be l’ami of a much-needed change? 
 
In this part I do not purport to come up with grand designs as to what to do. I 
suggest one very simple, easy to implement solution which, to my mind, might work 
wonders in future adjudication. Whenever the DSU mentions Secretariat it should 
mean Secretariat and not the Legal Affairs Divisions.9 Let me explain this point: instead 
                                                     
7 Although as I mentioned above, there are cases when even when presented with such expertise, 
panels decided to rule without having recourse to economics expertise.  
8 See among the many writings on this issue, Posner (1999) and Sykes (2002).  
9 A look into the WTO Organigram suggests that there is only one Legal Affairs Division. However, 
every division in the WTO is now staffed with lawyers. The Rules Division (dealing with contingent 
protection-ism) is now servicing almost always panels through its own layers. The Services Division 
 10 
of having lawyers servicing panels, all panels should be serviced by teams of 
lawyers – economists.10 There is no need to amend the existing text for that purpose. 
All that is required is that M. Lamy, upon arrival in Geneva (or a few days later) 
indicates to its personnel that from now on words will have their meaning, and, as a 
result, . His advisors can bombard him with a plethora of good arguments: antitrust 
practice has benefited enormously by opening up to economics expertise. To cite 
one, among numerous, examples: the European Court of Justice, not far 
(geographically or culturally) from M. Lamy’s background, on three occasions in 
2004 reversed the Commission’s findings on three merger cases, having first heard 
economists’ arguments to the effect that the merger analysis undertaken by the 
Commission left much to be desired. 
 
I am not pretending that this change alone will solve all problems. Not at all. But I 
am indeed suggesting that this is one simple way to provide rationality in dispute 
adjudication. It is fast relief with all plus and minuses of such prescriptions. But, to 
my mind, it is necessary relief as well, while awaiting a more thoughtful analysis of 
the situation.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
has followed suit and so on and so forth. In general, dispute adjudication is probably the most 
exciting feature of a WTO-bureaucrat’s (with the possible exception of the ERAD) career: in between 
rounds, the only activity in Geneva is dispute adjudication.    
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